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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As we move forward into a new millennium, a large number of Americans, 
especially senior citizens or those without insurance, will find it increasingly difficult 
to obtain prescription drugs because of rising prices.  International price increases 
have had the most severe consequences in third world countries where sixty percent 
of the population does not have regular access to essential drugs.1  While this paper 
focuses on domestic prescription drug prices, many analogies may be drawn between 
the problems created by high prescription drug prices in the United States and those 
in third world countries. 
Many have attributed rising prescription drug prices to the laissez-faire attitude 
of the U.S. federal government.  As a result, Congress has introduced new proposals 
to combat both these criticisms and prices.  Many of these proposals reduce the 
amount of protection granted to a patent holder of a newly developed prescription 
drug.  Large pharmaceutical companies are lobbying against these proposals, 
claiming that implementing such “price controls” will hinder the research and 
development of new and important drugs.2  They argue that the patent protection 
offered to pharmaceutical companies allows them to recoup and profit from their 
monetary investments on recently introduced drugs, and in turn, allows them to 
produce new essential drugs.3  Using this argument as a catalyst, the pharmaceutical 
                                                                
1Website of Essential Information, A Healthy Drug Policy for the Third World, at 
http://www.essential.org/monitor/hyper/issues/1992/12/mm1292_09.htm (website expired). 
2Carl B. Feldbaum, Loosening Patent Protection Hurts Drug Companies, PLAIN DEALER, 
Oct. 17, 1999, at 4G. 
3Id. 
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industry has pushed for the adoption of a style patent protection regime 
internationally.4  Ultimately, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) 
of the U.S. appealed successfully to the government to take retaliatory trade 
measures against third world countries that did not change existing national 
legislation, which provided no protection to pharmaceutical products.5   
High prescription drug prices must be reduced through a proposal that allows 
new drugs to be more accessible and affordable to those who need them, while 
maintaining the drug companies’ ability to profit and reinvest in new essential drugs. 
This article will discuss a recently proposed bill, The Affordable Prescription 
Drugs Act (APDA),6 and how it will attempt to strike a balance between reducing 
prices to make essential drugs more available and affordable, and working with 
pharmaceutical companies to make sure they profit and reinvest their money into 
research and development of new essential drugs.  It argues that the APDA increases 
competition in the market place, thus reducing the price of prescription drugs, while 
still allowing pharmaceutical companies to profit from their inventions.  In reaching 
this conclusion this article examines the bill itself, how to define an essential drug, 
whether current prices are fair, Congress’ attitude towards these prices, the drug 
industry’s justifications for high prices, and presents a rebuttal argument against 
those justifications. 
II.  THE AFFORDABLE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ACT 
Representative Sherrod Brown7 introduced APDA in the House of 
Representatives on September 23, 1999.8  The bill favors “good old fashioned 
American competition” by reducing the amount of patent protection granted to 
pharmaceutical companies.9  The APDA would allow the government to force price 
competition for drugs that provide a substantial health benefit, but carry an excessive 
price tag.10  It would accomplish this by issuing a compulsory license to a drug 
                                                                
4Website of Essential Information, supra note 1 (“It is only the pharmaceutical industry 
that has been trying to force the entire world to adopt U.S. style patent laws.”) 
5Id. (stating that the PMA has been successful in getting Third World countries such as 
Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand and Venezuela to change their patent laws 
to resemble those of the United States). 
6H.R. 2927, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999). 
7Sherrod Brown is an Ohio Democrat currently serving his fourth term as Representative 
of Ohio’s 13th Congressional District; he is the ranking member of the House Commerce 
Committee’s Health and Environment Subcommittee, at http://www.house. 
gov/sherrodbrown/bionew.htm. 
8H.R. 2927, supra note 6. 
9National Journal, American Health Line, Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates 
Crowded Field, Oct. 5, 1999, § Politics and Policy, at http://nationaljournal.com/ cgi-
bin/ifetch4?ENG+AMERICAN_HEALTHLINE+7-ahlindex+1052542-REVERSE+0+0+ 
26178+F+1+1+rx%&3a+AND+house+AND+navigates+AND+crowded+AND+field+AND+
PD%2f10%2f05%2f1999%2d%3e10%2f05%2f1999. 
10National Journal, American Health Line, Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would 
Lower Costs, Sept. 24, 1999, § Politics and Policy, at http://nationaljournal.com/ cgi-
bin/ifetch4?ENG+AMERICAN_HEALTHLINE-_-POLL_TRACK-_-AD_SPOT LIGHT+7-
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manufacturer to produce a generic version of a brand name drug which is still 
protected under patent.11 
Certain steps must be taken and requirements met before a compulsory license is 
granted.  The bill requires three important elements to be satisfied.  First, the 
Secretary of Health must determine “[s]uch compulsory license is necessary to 
alleviate health or safety needs which are not adequately satisfied by the patent 
holder, contractor, licensee, or assignee.”12  This first element determines whether 
the drug should be considered essential or non-essential.  If the drug has been 
determined to be essential or one that provides a “substantial health benefit,” the first 
requirement has been met.13     
The second element requires, “[t]he patented material is priced higher than may 
be reasonably expected based on criteria developed by the Secretary of 
Commerce.”14  This determines whether a drug’s price is so excessive that it bears no 
semblance to pricing norms for other industries.15  To help make this determination 
drug companies would be required to provide audited, detailed information on the 
expenses accumulated while developing the drug.16 Companies that fail to disclose 
such information would be ineligible to participate in federal health care programs.17  
After this information has been gathered and analyzed, if the selling price of the drug 
is determined to be “exorbitantly costly,” the bill’s second element has been met.18   
The third and final element states:  “The patent holder, contractor, licensee, or 
assignee . . . has not taken or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, 
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in a field of 
use.”19  This element functions as an “escape clause,” allowing the drug company to 
work with the government in voluntarily lowering prices.20  Thus, many drug 
companies could avoid a compulsory license if they decide to voluntarily lower their 
prices below an excessive price rate as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.   
If these elements are satisfied it will be determined that a compulsory license is 
necessary to reduce the price of the drug to make it more accessible and affordable to 
those who need it.  A generic manufacturer would then be granted a compulsory 
license to manufacture the drug while it is still under patent protection.21  During the 
                                                          
ahlindex+1021382_REVERSE+0+0+-1+F+9+13+1+prescription+AND+drugs 
%3atAND+two+AND+more+AND+bills+AND+WDuld+AND+lower+AND+costs. 
11Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates Crowded Field, supra note 9. 
12H.R. 2927, supra note 6. 
13Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would Lower Costs, supra note 10. 
14H.R. 2927, supra note 6. 
15106 CONG. REC. H10754 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1999) (statement of Rep. Brown). 
16Id. 
17Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would Lower Costs, supra note 10. 
18Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates Crowded Field, supra note 9. 
19H.R. 2927, supra note 6. 
20106 CONG. REC. H10754, supra note 15. 
21Medicare RX: House Committee Navigates Crowded Field, supra note 9. 
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period that the generic drug is on the market, the generic manufacturer would pay 
royalties to the original manufacturer.22  These royalties would help “amply reward” 
the patent holder for being the first on the market, while “Americans would benefit 
from competitively driven prices.”23 
It is important to note that the APDA does not use price controls to reduce 
prescription drug prices.24  Instead, the bill reduces drug industry monopoly power, 
while increasing consumer buying power by subjecting the drug industry to market-
driven competitive forces.25  The bill is a means of moderating prices that are too 
high without inadvertently setting prices too low. 
III.  HOW TO DEFINE AN ESSENTIAL DRUG AND EXCESSIVE PRICING 
An important and difficult element to determine is whether a drug should be 
considered essential.  Most would agree that life-saving drugs should be considered 
essential.  However, there are many drugs that fall into a gray area, such as the anti-
depressant Prozac whose determination as an essential drug will be difficult.   
The difficulty of this determination is compounded by the fact “that there is no 
established systematic process, either in our regulatory or medical structures, to 
establish criteria for identifying and prioritizing the most important drugs.…”26  So 
how will the Secretary of Health determine whether a drug is essential or non-
essential?  Some possible criteria include the volume of use of the drug, the number 
of people the drug will impact, the severity of the condition for which the drug is 
prescribed, or if the drug is used only to treat a life-threatening condition.27   
Such criteria lead to an array of difficult choices in determining what is an 
essential drug.  For example, proponents of treatments for rare life-threatening 
diseases view certain drugs as essential, even though these drugs may ultimately be 
used on a relatively small amount of the general population.28  In contrast, drugs used 
to treat medical conditions such as ulcers, while not a life-threatening disease, would 
be more widely prescribed and impact a larger portion of the population.29 
Determining how an essential drug is defined is a complex issue.  Yet, 
developing a definition and process for identifying essential drugs is imperative for 
the success of the APDA.  Possible models that can be examined in order to 
determine whether a drug is essential or non-essential are those used by many third 
world countries that have already produced an essential drug list.30  According to the 
                                                                
22Prescription Drugs: Two More Bills Would Lower Costs, supra note 10. 
23106 CONG. REC. H10754, supra note 15.  
24Id. 
25Id. 
26Jeffrey L. Blumer, Essential Drugs for Infants and Children: North American 
Perspective, PEDIATRICS, Sept. 1999, at 603. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
29Id. 
30Michael R. Reich, The Global Drug Gap, SCIENCE, Mar. 17, 2000, available at http//: 
www.biotech-info.net/drug_gap.html. 
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World Health Organization (WHO), more than sixty countries have operationalized 
essential drug programs, with thirty more in the process of drafting such programs.31  
These essential drug lists were initiated in poorer countries in order to ensure a 
reasonable level of health care for as many people as possible.32 
The WHO has been a large promoter of the concept of essential drugs “to 
advance health equity through expanded access to basic medicines for poor people in 
poor countries.”33  Currently, the WHO’s Tenth Model list of essential drugs 
contains 306 active drugs.34  Such a list allows a country to focus its efforts on 
supplying the most important drugs to a population that is unable to gain access to 
them. 
Experts have argued that using the WHO’s Model List as a basis will prove to be 
largely ineffective “[b]ecause of the great differences between countries, the 
preparation of a drug list of uniform, general applicability is not feasible or possible.  
Therefore each country has the direct responsibility of evaluating and adopting a list 
of essential drugs, according to its own policy in the field of health.”35  This 
argument is countered by recent studies of various essential drug lists from different 
countries, which have shown surprisingly small variations of drugs determined to be 
essential.36  The theory behind this lack of diversity is that diseases normally 
transcend national boundaries in symptoms and cures.37  
While an essential drug list developed in America should be broadly based on the 
WHO’s Eleventh Model List, it should also incorporate the specific criteria that will 
make it more suited to the economic and medical needs of Americans.  
Another problematic element is the determination of when a drug’s price should 
be considered excessive.  This requirement poses the problem of determining what 
financial statistics are relevant.  The drug industry will inevitably argue that the cost 
of research and development of drugs that failed to reach the market should be 
included in this calculation.  The industry argues that “[o]f every 5,000 medicines 
tested, on average, only five are tested in clinical trials and only one of those is 
approved for patient use.  Revenues from successful medicines must cover the costs 
of the dry holes.”38  Furthermore, only three of every ten prescription drugs available 
in America generates revenues that meet or exceed average research and 
                                                                
31Dzulkifli Abdu Razak & Pusat Racun Negara, National Essential Drug List Hailed, NEW 
STRAITS TIMES, (Mar. 2, 1996) at 11, at http://www.prn.usm.my/edl/nedl.html. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34Id. 
35Id. 
36Razak, supra note 31. 
37Id. 
38PhRMA, Why Do Medicines Cost So Much? at http://www. 
Phrma.org/publications/brochure/questions/. 
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development costs.39  The industry average for bringing just one new medicine to the 
market is $500 million.40  
To determine what is an excessive price, the Secretary of Commerce most 
accurately determine how much was spent to develop the drug.  As will be discussed 
later, a complication in determining the amount spent on a new drug is that a large 
portion of research and development costs are not paid by the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Thus, for an accurate determination of an excessive price only those 
research and development expenditures paid by the company should be considered 
relevant. 
IV.  THE RISING COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS  
Soaring drug prices represent a health crisis that is sweeping this nation.41  
Currently, the prices of prescription drugs are rising twice as fast as the inflation 
rate.42  Hardest hit by these price increases are senior citizens and the uninsured.  
Recent statistics indicate “[a] third of all seniors, over 10 million seniors, lack drug 
coverage; millions more are barely insured; employers are dropping their retiree 
coverage and private health insurers are cutting back their prescription drug 
benefits.”43  Since senior citizens consume one-third of all prescriptions and many 
live on low fixed incomes, such actions have made them the most vulnerable 
segment of the American population to rising prescription drug prices.44   
Much like senior citizens, those without insurance coverage have also found it 
difficult to obtain much needed prescription drugs.  Uninsured families are often 
charged two or three times more for prescription drugs than those who are insured.45  
The pharmaceutical industry agrees with these figures stating that private insurance 
companies pay drug prices thirty to thirty-nine percent lower than those charged to 
individuals without prescription drug insurance.46  Higher costs for the uninsured are 
attributed to the uninsured having no one to negotiate lower prices on their behalf.47 
In both instances higher drug prices have lead to many difficult decisions for 
those who cannot afford them.  People are making decisions that put their health in 
jeopardy, often choosing between purchasing food and purchasing medicine for 
themselves or their families.48  A seventy-one-year-old widow from Sheffield Lake, 
Ohio, reported that since United Health Care pulled out of her county she has little 
                                                                
39Id. 
40Id. 
41John Freeman, Cutting Drug Prices and Saving Lives, METRO TIMES, July 5, 2000, 
available at http://www.metrotimes.com/20/40/features/newcutting.htm. 
42Id. 
43146 CONG. REC. H1127 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Brown).  
44Freeman, supra note 41. 
45Id. 
46Id.  
47Id. 
48Id. 
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drug coverage left.49  The coverage she does have is absorbed by just one of her 
medications.50  This seventy-one-year-old woman was forced to take a part time job 
in order to subsidize her low fixed income and help pay for her prescription drugs.  A 
seventy-six-year-old woman from Elyria, Ohio stated, “I desperately need 
prescription drug help.  Up until two weeks ago I worked three jobs, now I am 
working two jobs.  Without working I can not [sic] afford to live.  I don’t know how 
much longer I will be able to work.”51  The elderly are not the only group feeling the 
effects of high prescription drug prices.  The middle-aged also have found it difficult 
to afford prescription drugs as reported by a man from Medina, Ohio:  “Not only 
does [sic] high prescription (prices) affect senior citizens (but it also affects the) 
middle-age as well.  When you take (into account) maintenance medication (i.e. [sic] 
high blood pressure, estrogen replacement, … etc.) the cost effects us too.  [A] 
decision has to be made – Do you eat or buy medication?”52   
On a larger international scale, citizens of third world countries face severe 
consequences because of accessibility problems, and mirror many of the dilemmas 
faced by America’s senior citizens and uninsured.  An example of this is the AIDS 
epidemic in Africa and the excessive price of the drug AZT.  As the AIDS epidemic 
continues to rage out of control in Africa, families that must care for a member 
infected with the virus often deplete monetary resources, which would otherwise be 
used for necessities, such as healthy food, or as an investment in their children’s 
futures.53   
V.  ARE CURRENT PRICES FAIR? 
This leads us to the question of whether current drug prices are fair?54  
Comparisons of prescription drug prices in other industrialized nations and prices for 
veterinary medicines, with average prices Americans pay demonstrate they are not. 
A recent survey shows that on average U.S. citizens are charged 205 percent 
more than their Canadian neighbors for the same prescription drugs.55  For example, 
the medication Cipro, which is used to treat infections, has an average wholesale 
price of $171.59 in Canada.56  The same medication sold in the U.S., by the same 
manufacturer, in the same dosage and quantity of pills, has a wholesale price of 
$399.63, which represents a 233 percent increase from the Canadian price.57  Other 
                                                                
49Statement of Representative Sherrod Brown, The Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, at 
http://www.house.gov.sherrodbrown/afpda.htm. 
50Representative Sherrod Brown, Prescription Drug Stories From Seniors, at 
http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/rxstories.htm. 
51Id.  
52Id. 
53Website of CNN, AIDS Leaves Africa’s Economic Future in Doubt, at 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/aids/stories/economic.impact.htm. 
54146 CONG. REC. H1127, supra note 43. 
55Senator Byron Dorgan, Rising Drug Costs are a Pain, at 
http//www.senate.gov/~dorgan/prescriptioncosts.htm1.  
56Id. 
57Id. 
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examples of such price discrepancies include Zocor, a cholesterol reducing 
medication, and Tamoxifen, which is used to treat breast cancer.  In Canada, sixty 
tablets of Zocor costs $44; in the U.S. the same dosage of Zocor costs $102.58  
Remarkably, a month supply of Tamoxifen sells for $156 in the U.S. and only $12 in 
Canada.59  Not only do these discrepancies exist between Canada and the U.S., they 
also exist between the U.S. and other industrialized nations such as Germany, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Italy.60 
Why are the U.S. drug prices disproportionate when compared to other 
industrialized nations?  It is because the U.S. does not demand that drug 
manufacturers reduce their prices.61  Instead of using the collective purchasing power 
of thirty-eight million senior citizens to demand fairly priced drugs, the U.S. simply 
retreats when drug manufacturers warn that any such action may stifle research and 
development of new drugs.62 
A comparison of medicines used by both animals and humans also demonstrates 
that current drug prices are unequal and inherently unfair.  Manufacturers charge an 
average of 106 percent to 151 percent more for prescription drugs used by humans 
compared to the price of the same drug when used by animals.63  A recent study 
shows that a group of drugs manufactured by the same company in the same dosage 
and form, used by both people and pets, costs on average 131 percent more when the 
drug is intended for human rather than animal use.64   
A good example of the price disparity between veterinary medicines and human 
medicines is the price of the drug Lanoxin, used in the treatment of heart failure.65  A 
human purchasing Lanoxin will pay $25.65, however, make that exact same 
purchase, in the same dosage and form for your pet and you only pay $6.36.66  
Another example of these price differentials can be found in the frequently 
prescribed antibiotic Augmentin.67  A manufacturer selling Augmentin for animal 
use charges $18.00 for a one-month supply.68  When the same manufacturer sells a 
one-month supply of the drug for human consumption the price skyrockets to 
                                                                
58145 CONG. REC. H11148 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1999) (statement of Rep. Brown).  
59Id. 
60For every U.S. dollar spent on prescription drugs on average Germany only pays 
seventy-one cents, Sweden sixty-eight cents, U.K. sixty-five cents, Canada sixty-four cents, 
France fifty-seven cents, and Italy fifty-one cents, Dorgan, supra note 55. 
61146 Cong. Rec. H1127, supra note 43. 
62Id. 
63Website of Sherrod Brown, Study Shows that Drug Manufacturers’ Prices are More that 
Double for Humans than for Animals, available at http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/ 
drugm31.htm.  
64Id. 
65Freeman, supra note 41. 
66Id. 
67Study Shows that Drug Manufacturers’ Prices are More that Double for Humans than 
for Animals, supra note 63.  
68Id. 
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$56.40.69  By subtracting the manufacturer’s price increase paid by humans for 
popular drugs such as these, consumers would pay an average of 25 percent to 38 
percent less at the pharmacy per year.  
The pharmaceutical industry attempts to explain this discrepancy by reasoning 
that veterinary drug prices cost less because of lower research and development 
costs, and less restrictive testing standards that are less restrictive which lead to less 
expensive production costs.70  However, lower research and development costs do 
not justify the cost discrepancies.  As stated by Dr. Alan Sager, an industry expert:  
“The observed price differences cannot be explained by differences in research costs.  
Research is a fixed or sunk cost. Manufacturers do not set their prices based on 
recovery of these costs.  Instead, they set their prices as high as possible in order to 
maximize revenue and profit.”71  Higher production costs due to more restrictive 
safety standards also fails to account for these price differentials.  The Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA) “good manufacturing practice requirements,” codified 
in 21 C.F.R. part 211, which are designed to ensure drug quality and consistency, are 
applied to both human and animal drugs.72  According to the FDA, “The methods, 
facilities, and controls under which animal drugs are manufactured, processed, 
packaged, or held for sale must conform to the requirements of the regulations for 
Current Good Manufacturing Practices in the drug industry generally.”73 
These price differentials demonstrate the price-gouging attitude of many large 
pharmaceutical companies.  The vulnerability of today’s U.S. senior citizens and 
uninsured has allowed these companies to place the burden of paying high prices for 
necessary drugs on these segments of the U.S. public.  The continuation of such a 
burden will no doubt result in an elderly society saturated with sickness, and without 
the ability to pay for drugs that will help. 
VI.  CONGRESSIONAL LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH  
While drug prices continue to increase to the point where millions of U.S. 
citizens cannot afford the high costs of prescription drugs, the majority in Congress 
refuses to take action to help reduce these prices.74  This laizze-faire attitude that 
Congress has taken can be attributed to the drug industry’s lobbying power and 
constant threat that money for “research and development will dry up.”75 
                                                                
69Id. 
70PhRMA, Prescription Drugs: Are Fido and Fluffy Getting a Better Deal?, at 
http://www.phrma.org/publications/documents/backgrounders/2000.phtm. 
71Representative Elijah E. Cummings, Prescription Drug Price Discrimination: Drug 
Manufacturer Prices Are Higher for Humans than for Animals, at http://www.house.gov/ 
cummings/drugrpt3/comprpt8.htm. 
72Id. 
73Id.  
74145 CONG. REC. H10754 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000) (statement of Rep. Brown). 
75Representative Sherrod Brow, Statement at House Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment Hearing (Sept. 28, 1999), available at 
http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/medpresdrg 920.htm. 
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Even when Congress has taken action against high drug prices, strong lobbying 
by the drug industry has led to watered down measures.  An excellent example is the 
recently approved Agriculture Appropriations Conference Report.76  Originally, this 
legislation would have established drug re-importation from other countries by 
eliminating a federal law that gives manufacturers a monopoly over drug imports.77  
It ultimately would have allowed the same drugs that are being sold at a lower price 
in countries such as Canada to be brought back into the U.S. and sold at a lower price 
here.78  In order to fight off these measures, the pharmaceutical industry spent 
millions of dollars on television, radio and newspaper ads in an attempt to expunge 
the provisions during committee meetings.79  This effort by the pharmaceutical 
industry led to a final law, which included language filled with various 
pharmaceutical industry backed loopholes, making the provisions largely 
ineffective.80  “Specifically the provisions limit where prescription drugs can be 
imported from, allows the pharmaceutical industry to force foreign wholesalers to 
sell products at the inflated American price, and revokes the bill after five years.”81  
Another excellent example of Congress’ reluctance to take action against 
prescription drug prices is the recently proposed “Sanders Amendment.”82  The 
Sanders Amendment was proposed specifically in order to enforce the already 
existing Bayh-Dole provisions, which require the reasonable pricing of prescription 
drugs.83  The mere fact that Congress must attempt to enact legislation in order to 
enforce already existing legislation to lower drug prices leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that the pharmaceutical industries lobbying power has succeeded.  
VII.  CONGRESSIONAL EXTENSIONS OF PATENT PROTECTION  
Not only has the majority of Congress opposed new laws which would help 
reduce the price of prescription drugs, but they have also passed legislation to extend 
the length of patent protection granted to these drugs.  The pharmaceutical industry 
gained a major extension in its patent term when Congress enacted the Patent Term 
Extension to the Waxman-Hatch Act.84  Section 155 of the Act states, “the term of a 
patent . . . shall be extended if such composition or process has been subjected to a 
regulatory review by the Federal Food and Drug Administration pursuant to the 
                                                                
76Representative Sherrod Brown, Brown: The Gop Forsakes Seniors for Drug Companies, 
at http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/drugo11.html. 
77Id. 
78Asad Jaleel, Congress Finally Acts to Cover Prescription Price, JOURNAL FOR PRE 
HEALTH AFFILIATED STUDENTS, available at http://icaius.cc.uic.edu/orgs/jphas/fall2001/ 
invitedopinion_ol.html. 
79Brown: The Gop Forsakes Seniors for Drug Companies, supra note 76. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Id.  
83Id. 
8435 U.S.C. §155 (2001). 
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Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.”85  Section 155 effectively allowed the drug 
industry to gain up to five years of added protection for any drug subjected to the 
FDA’s regulatory procedures.86  The pharmaceutical industry has taken full 
advantage of this provision extending patent protection and higher prices of many 
important prescription drugs.87 
Once again in 1995, many pharmaceutical companies gained an extension on 
their patents.  Pharmaceutical companies benefited from a ruling on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which extended many prescription drug patents 
from seventeen years to twenty years.88  This ruling allowed prescription drugs such 
as Zantac, an ulcer medication, whose patent protection was about to expire, to reap 
the monopolistic benefits of patent protection for three more years.89  According to 
the Prime Institute at the University of Minnesota, an institution that does research 
on pharmaceutical economics and public policy issues, this extension has cost 
consumers an extra 6.2 billion dollars in spending on prescription drugs.90 
Another recent attempt by Congress to extend the patent protection of 
prescription drugs occurred in 1998.  A proposed rider to the 1998 Agriculture 
Appropriations bill would have allowed manufacturers of seven prescription drugs to 
petition the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for additional patent term extensions 
beyond those allowed by the Hatch-Waxman Act.91  One drug that would have 
benefited from this extension was the top anti-arthritis drug Relafen that had already 
grossed sales of $419 million.92  The availability of a generic version of Relafen 
would save consumers $268 to $535 a year while total annual savings to all health 
care payers would range from $126 million to $252 million.93  Fortunately, for senior 
citizens, the rider did not go through; however, this is an excellent example of how 
costly a “second bite at the patent apple” can be for seniors citizens on a fixed 
income.94 
VIII.  PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES EXTEND PATENT PROTECTION  
Despite Congressional patent extensions, pharmaceutical companies have used 
unscrupulous methods to unfairly extend their drug patents in order to reap the 
benefits of a patent monopoly.  One method used by large pharmaceutical companies 
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to extend their patent protection is to keep generic drugs from the market by paying 
off manufacturers to refrain from producing the generic version for a limited time.95  
In FTC v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,96 a large pharmaceutical company, 
Hoechst, attempted to delay the introduction of a generic version of the brand name 
hypertension and angina drug, Cardizem CD, that they produce.97  Hoechst and 
Andrx, generic drug manufacturers, entered into an agreement in which Hoechst 
agreed to pay Andrx millions of dollars, and in return Andrx would not enter the 
market with the generic version of the drug during the term of the agreement.98  
Another similar conspiracy involved Abbott and Geneva Laboratories. Abbott 
Laboratories develops, manufactures and sells a variety of health care products and 
services including a drug called Hytrin, which is used to treat two chronic conditions 
that affect millions of Americans, particularly senior citizens, high blood pressure 
and enlarged prostate.99  Abbott Laboratories conspired with Geneva, one of the 
leading generic drug manufacturers in the U.S., to delay the sale of a generic version 
of Hytrin, terazosin HCL.100  The agreement between Abbott and Geneva was that 
Abbott would pay Geneva $4.5 million dollars per month and in return Geneva 
would not offer HCL in competition with Hytrin for a limited time.101  “Without a 
lower-priced generic alternative, consumers, government agencies, health plans, 
pharmacies, hospitals, wholesalers, and others were forced to purchase Abbott’s 
more expensive Hytrin product.”102 
Such conspiracies are in direct conflict with the Hatch-Waxman Act, which 
facilitates the entry of generic drugs into the market while maintaining incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in new drugs.103  These conspiracies have a 
direct and substantial effect on consumer savings.104  The entry of generic drugs into 
the market plays a key role in lowering prices of prescription drugs. Generic drugs 
usually have an immediate impact on the market place; pharmacists generally select 
lower priced drugs for their brand name substitute, and third party payers of 
prescription drugs, such as Medicaid programs, encourage or insist upon the use of 
                                                                
95Skull-Druggery Patients’ Access to Drugs Must be Ensured, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 
15, 2000, at 8a. 
96Website of Federal Trade Commission, Conduct Involving Health Care Services and 
Products, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc.hcindex/conduct.htm. 
97No. D9293 (FTC complaint issued Mar. 16, 2000). 
98Id. (“Because of Hatch-Waxman provisions which grant the initial generic manufacturer 
a 180 day market exclusivity period, the complaint alleges the effect of the agreement was to 
ensure that no other company’s generic drug could obtain FDA approval and enter the market 
during the term of the agreement.”). 
99Website of Federal Trade Commission, Analysis to Aid Public Comment, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05.abbottgenevaanalysis.htm. 
100Id. 
101Id. 
102Id. 
103Id. 
104Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 99. 
2001-02] THE AFFORDABLE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ACT 157 
generic drugs.105  Studies have shown that generic drugs sell for thirty to sixty 
percent less than brand name drugs.106  Furthermore, estimates by the Congressional 
Budget Office Report have shown that lower prices from generic drugs have saved 
consumers $8-10 billion per year on prescriptions at retail pharmacies.107 
Pharmaceutical companies have also unfairly extended their patent protection by 
double patenting the same drug.  In order for a company to acquire a drug patent the 
PTO must find its claim to be novel, useful, and non-obvious.108  As a result, if a 
company attempts to extend a patent of an existing patented drug by bringing in a 
new claim for a drug patent that is similar to the already patented drug, the claim 
should fail because of obviousness.109  To simplify, by claiming a second invention, 
the pharmaceutical company is simply looking to extend the underlying first patent. 
Such attempted extensions of patent protection by pharmaceutical companies are 
illegal under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.110  “The doctrine of 
obviousness-type double patenting prohibits a party from securing an unjustified 
extension of its exclusive rights through claims in a later patent that are not 
patentably distinct from earlier claims.”111  Obviousness-type double patenting 
requires the court to take a two-step analysis.112  First, the court must determine 
whether the second claim encompasses the subject matter of the first claim.113  
Second, the court must determine if the second claim is patentably distinct from 
earlier claims.114 
In Eli Lilly Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,115 the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit held that Barr Laboratories’ attempt to manufacture a generic version of 
Prozac did not infringe upon an existing Eli Lilly patent because of obviousness-type 
double patenting.116  In 1977, Eli Lilly patented claim ‘895 for the marketing of 
fluoxetine hydrochloride to be used as an anti-depressant in humans.117  This patent 
was set to expire in 1994.118  In 1984, Eli Lilly patented claim ‘549 for the marketing 
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of flouxetine hydrochloride to be used in the treatment of serotonin uptake in 
animals.119  This patent was set to expire in 2003.120  In 1995, Barr Laboratories filed 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application under the Hatch-Waxman Act to market 
fluoxetine hydrochloride as an anti-depressant.  On April 10, 1996 Eli Lilly brought 
an infringement action against Barr for infringement of claim ‘549, which had yet to 
expire.121 
Applying the two-step analysis, the Federal Circuit first determined that the later 
claim encompassed the same subject matter of the previous claim.122  The court then 
attempted to determine “whether the differences in subject matter between the two 
claims are patentably distinct.”123  The court found that the only discernible 
difference between the two patents was that the earlier patent addressed the treatment 
of depression in humans while the later patent addressed the treatment of serotonin 
uptake in animals.124  Relying upon previous case law, the Federal Circuit held that 
the use of fluoxetine hydrochloride in two different species was not enough to make 
the two separate claims patentably distinct.125  
Generic drug manufacturers have also played a role in keeping prescription drug 
prices high.  In a case that was scheduled to be ready for trial early this year, Mylan 
Laboratories, the second largest U.S. generic drug manufacturer, was accused of 
cornering the market on raw materials for two popular drugs lorazepam and 
chlorazepate.126  Mylan attempted to restrain competition from other generic drug 
manufacturers by acquiring exclusive licensing arrangements for the supply of the 
raw materials necessary to produce both of the generic drugs, thereby allowing 
Mylan laboratories to dramatically increase the price of both lorazepam and 
chlorazepate.127  Mylan Laboratories has agreed to pay $147 million in order to settle 
these charges.128  
Such actions taken by the pharmaceutical industry increases the amount of patent 
protection beyond the limits deemed appropriate by Congress.  These 
patent/monopoly extensions have had and will continue to have a detrimental effect 
on the accessibility and affordability of prescription drugs.  By the time of patent 
expiration, United States consumers have more than compensated the drug industry 
for its innovative expenditures, and are being cheated out of lower priced generic 
drugs by the unscrupulous patent extensions of a spoiled industry. 
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IX.  DRUG INDUSTRY’S JUSTIFICATION FOR HIGHER PRICES  
Repeatedly, drug companies have made the same threat: “If you don’t leave drug 
prices alone, we won’t produce any new drugs.”129  They argue that any type of 
action taken by the government to reduce the price of prescription drugs will 
inevitably lead to a decrease in the profits necessary to fund research and 
development of new life-saving drugs.130  This threat has not only led to a reluctance 
on the part of the government to interject regulatory policies, but it has also made 
many essential prescription drugs unavailable to the elderly and uninsured. 
Many pharmaceutical companies have taken up arms against the APDA in an 
effort to keep the bill from becoming a law.  They have projected that research-based 
pharmaceutical companies will invest an estimated $24 billion dollars in research 
and development of new medicines.131  They argue that the APDA will be 
detrimental to any hope for new cures, and will jeopardize the current development 
of new drugs by forcing companies to reduce their patent protection to new break 
through drugs.132  Alan F. Homer President of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhMRA”) has stated: 
We couldn’t keep up the current, pro-patient research momentum if 
Representative Brown’s bill were enacted into law.  More investment 
dollars instead would flow to other products that have intellectual 
property protection, instead of to medicines.  If we want to continue the 
remarkable strides in health, we need to keep strong intellectual property 
protection for medicines in place.133 
Domestic biotechnology companies are also investing large amounts of money to 
lobby against the APDA.  The U.S. biotechnology industry leads the world in health-
care innovation.134  These cutting edge companies are developing drugs for many 
debilitating illnesses, such as Alzheimer’s disease, various cancers and heart 
disease.135  Many biotechnology companies argue that patents provide a limited 
amount of market protection from competitors, and this protection gives these 
innovative companies the opportunity to recoup their enormous investments in new 
drugs.  Furthermore, they argue that without patent protection private investors have 
no incentive for risking their capital.136 
Carl B. Feldbaum, President of Biotechnology Industry Organization, has taken a 
strong opposition against the APDA, and any other regulatory action that will reduce 
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the price of drugs.  In a recent interview, Feldbaum stated “we will aggressively 
oppose any legislation that undermines innovation through either overt or covert 
disguised government imposed drug price controls.  Anything that artificially lowers 
reimbursement rates and keeps our companies from bringing new drugs to market 
and to patients.”137  Feldbaum points to the record twenty-one drugs produced by 
biotech companies and approved by the FDA in 1998.138  He argues that biotech 
companies, that produce new innovative drugs, could not have done so under a 
system of regulatory price controls.139  Speaking specifically of the APDA, Feldbaum 
stated, “[i]nstead of helping seniors and other patients, Brown’s legislation clearly 
would hurt them by impeding new drug development.  Many biotech drugs and 
vaccines under development are aimed at diseases, such as Alzheimer’s, where no 
treatments are available.”140  Biotech industry representatives are quick to note the 
majority of their drugs are still in the research stage, and their continued 
development relies upon the venture capital obtained by drugs already on the 
market.141 
Pharmaceutical companies also argue that higher prices are justified since today’s 
drugs do considerably more than drugs from the past.142  Examples include recently 
introduced drugs that reduce cholesterol, lower blood pressure, treat depression, 
battle cancer, and improve patients’ quality of life.143  The drug industry explains that 
not only do prescription drugs offer the most ideal therapeutic option, they are also 
the most feasible economic alternatives.144  An example of the possible economic 
benefits of prescription drugs are the cost savings of purchasing  new prescription 
drugs compared to patient hospitalization.  One week of hospitalization in the U.S. 
for a patient with schizophrenia costs nearly the same as a full year of treatment with 
a newer antipsychotic drug, such as Zyprexa.145 
However, the fact that a drug offers additional benefits cannot be a viable 
economic rationale for higher drug prices.  The only justifiable argument for higher 
prices is recoupment of research and development costs, not the public benefit that a 
drug affords.  
The drug industry proclaims that the best way to ensure the accessibility of new 
drugs is to avoid governmental price controls and focus more on adopting a 
Medicare modernization position.146  Such a position would allow drug companies to 
                                                                
137Interview by WaBio.com with Carl Feldbaum, C.E.O. Biotechnology Industry 
Organization, at http://www.wabio.com/ind/annrpt/ceo905F/feldbaum.htm. 
138Id. 
139Id.  
140Id. 
141Id. 
142Eli Lilly and Co., 1999 Annual Report: Are Drug Prices Fair, available at  
http://www.lilly.com.about.invstro.99report/english/at_prices.html. 
143Id. 
144Id. 
145Id. 
146Feldbaum Interview, supra note 137. 
2001-02] THE AFFORDABLE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ACT 161 
continue to charge monopolistic prices, while, allegedly, making prescription drugs 
more available and affordable to the public. 
X.  REBUTTAL ARGUMENT  
The drug industry’s threat that any action by the government to reduce 
prescription drug prices would ultimately decrease the industry’s ability to create 
new drugs has been very effective.  However, consumers and Congress should be 
wary of the truth behind such a threat.   
While research and development of new drugs is as important to health care as 
availability and lower prices, the pharmaceutical industries threat has no merit when 
we determine who really pays for the research and development of new drugs.  What 
the drug industry does not reveal is that they do not bear the major burden of funding 
research and development of new drugs.147  Presently, the federal government funds 
all of the basic research and development of new drugs through the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH).148  In fact, through the NIH, U.S. taxpayers finance 42 
percent of the research and development that produces new drugs.149 Furthermore, 
private foundations, state and local governments, and other non-industry sources 
represent eleven percent of the funding for research and development of new 
drugs.150  The pharmaceutical companies are usually only involved in funding the 
clinical testing of new compounds for safety and effectiveness in order to gain 
regulatory approval for applications of the new drug.151  “The NIH and independent 
scientists working with NIH grants, generally do the hard part and take the biggest 
risks, yet there is no system for sharing the drug companies’ subsequent profits with 
the public treasury or for setting moderate prices that don’t gouge consumers.”152 
Furthermore, the drug industry’s threat that research and development of new 
drugs will be chilled by any actions taken to lower prescription drug prices is less 
effective when we examine the large tax breaks given to pharmaceutical companies 
for their research and development expenditures.  Congress bestowed these generous 
tax breaks upon drug companies in order to give them an incentive to invest more of 
their time and effort into the research and development of new essential drugs.153  
The tax breaks are enormous. Drug manufacturers pay an effective tax rate of ten 
percentage points lower than the average for all major industries.154  These tax breaks 
diminish the drug industry’s argument that profits from high drug prices are the 
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driving force behind the research and development of new drugs, and that Congress 
will chill that research and development by tampering with prices. 
The enormous amount of profitability and success of the drug industry is yet 
another indicator that lower drug prices will do little to affect the research and 
development of new drugs.  Currently, drug companies’ profits are greater than those 
of any other industry by at least five percent.155  These profits are expected to grow 
by 16-18 percent over the next four years.156  This growth rate is about three times 
greater than that of the average profit growth rate for any other Fortune 500 
company.157  Drug industry revenues have reached a staggering $106 billion dollars 
per year.158  These large profit margins have created an enormous amount of 
financial security for these companies and their representatives.  In 1999, Bristol-
Meyers Squibb paid its CEO a $1.2 million salary, a $1.9 million bonus, and $30.4 
million in stock options.159  Such expenditures and large profits should make it 
difficult for the U.S. public to believe that high prescription drug prices are necessary 
in order for drug companies to prosper and invest more in research and development.  
It seems as if their cup is already full. 
Furthermore, the drug industry’s search for profitable drugs has had a detrimental 
effect on the research and development of less profitable drugs for rare life 
threatening diseases.  In 1983, Congress recognized this danger and attempted to 
stimulate drug development in this area by enacting into law the Orphan Drug Act 
(ODA).160  The intent of the Act is to offer an incentive to the pharmaceutical 
industry to produce drugs which, without governmental assistance, would be 
unprofitable.161   
The ODA is applicable upon the FDA’s determination that absent the ODA’s 
granting of exclusive rights, and financial assistance, a rare disease would not 
receive the attention necessary to produce a cure.162  If such a determination is made 
than an exclusive seven-year right to market a drug is necessary to treat the disease 
will be granted to a manufacturer willing to research and develop the drug.163  Public 
monies through a variety of research grants, tax credits, and other subsidies subsidize 
these drugs’ research and development.164  In order to receive these incentives it must 
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be proven that the disease affects less than 200,000 people.165  While there is no 
actual patent granted by the ODA, “the effects of its exclusive right often are 
indistinguishable from those of a patent.166  Arguably, the Act suffers from a serious 
constitutional defect in that the exclusive rights granted offer the same amount of 
protection that a patent offers, yet the patent requirements of novelty, non-
obviousness, and distinctiveness are not required.167 
Regardless of its constitutionality, the ODA is an example of the drug industry’s 
exploitation of legislation enacted for the public good, to gain larger profits.  
However, in many respects the ODA has been a success.  Ten years before it was 
enacted, only ten ‘orphan drugs’ that were used to treat rare debilitating diseases 
were developed without governmental assistance.168  After ten years as law, 513 
drugs were determined to be ‘orphan drugs,’ and the FDA licensed eighty-seven of 
those for sale.169  Yet, the drug industry has taken full advantage of the seven-year 
exclusive market right by charging extraordinarily high prices for ‘orphan drugs’ that 
are almost completely subsidized by public monies.170   
The development of drugs for AIDS highlights the industry’s attempt to 
manipulate the ODA to gain larger profits.  When the epidemic first began, the 
reluctance of the drug industry to research and develop in this area was linked to a 
lack of potential profit.171  Realizing how beneficial the ODA could be for 
profitability, companies, such as Burroughs Wellcome, were able to develop new 
drugs, such as AZT, through public funds and subsequently charge an exorbitantly 
high price for it due to the seven-year market right granted via the ODA.172   
High prices of orphan drugs are an example of pharmaceutical companies taking 
advantage of an inherent flaw in the ODA; “Although the act presumes limited 
profitability, it does not require that it be demonstrated.  Absent that requirement, the 
ODA has often been used to increase the marketing advantages of a drug that would 
have enjoyed sufficient potential profitability from its patent exclusivity alone.”173  
The drug industries manipulation of the ODA is another example of the lengths the 
industry will go for profits. 
Many drug companies would have Americans believe that the majority of their 
profits go towards research and development of new drugs.  However, since the FDA 
has allowed direct-to-the-consumer advertising campaigns the majority of their 
profits have gone towards the marketing of new drugs.  The pharmaceutical industry 
has decided to gradually shift the core of its spending away from creating new drugs 
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and towards the steadier business of marketing them.174  A recent study by the 
National Institute for Health Care (NIHC) shows that 25 of the most heavily 
advertised drugs accounted for more than 40 percent of the increase in retail drug 
spending last year.175  Between 1998 and 1999 the amount of money spent on 
consumer advertising increased from $1.3 billion dollars to $1.8 billion dollars.176  
The analysis further shows that consumer advertising could be responsible for 10-
25% of the recent increase in prescription drug prices.177 Just one example of the 
enormous amount of advertising spent on a prescription drug is that of the allergy 
medication Clariton.  Clariton is one of the most heavily advertised drugs in the 
U.S..178  In 1999, Schering-Plough, the manufacturer of Clariton, spent over $137 
million in advertising the drug.179 
Another type of advertising large pharmaceutical companies sink major 
investments into are donations made to political groups to increase their lobbying 
power.  Companies such as Pfizer and Bristol-Myers Squibb lead the pack with totals 
of  $1,683,433 and $1,648,668, respectively.180  In both cases about 84 percent of 
these donations were made to the Republican Party.181 
Contrary to what the drug industry would like the American public to believe, the 
large profits made from high prescription drug prices are not used to extensively 
research and develop new drugs.  Rather, the majority of these profits are used for 
advertising and lobbying.  This is yet another reason why the drug industry’s threat 
that research and development will dry up without the high prices charged to 
Americans is without merit.  
Another excellent indicator that the drug industry’s threat is idle is the success of 
past legislative actions that regulate the industry.  Congress proposed legislation to 
pave the way for a stronger generic drug industry in 1983.182  Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act generic competitors would be allowed to enter the market and compete 
with brand-name drugs in a more reasonable fashion.183  Much like the present 
scenario, when the Hatch-Waxman Act was proposed, brand-name drug 
manufactures claimed that competition from generic drug producers that would 
result in lower drug prices would have a significant chilling effect on research and 
development of new drugs.184  Ignoring this threat, Congress enacted the Hatch-
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Waxman Act, and the generic drug industry now manufactures nearly fifty percent of 
all drugs dispensed in the U.S..185  Yet, even with this increase in competition, the 
drug industry’s own estimates of the amount of research and development conducted 
increased dramatically.186  The past success of the Hatch-Waxman Act in increasing 
competition and lowering prices, while not dampening research and development of 
new drugs, should be an excellent indicator that lower drug prices and increased 
competition do not necessarily lead to a reduction in new drugs. 
XI.  ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APDA  
Lowering the price of prescription drugs is vital to the health and well being of 
our nation.  These drugs are not luxury items, for which consumers can shop 
elsewhere for lower prices.187  Instead, these drugs are a necessity to millions of 
Americans who often cannot live without them.188 Strong patent protection of new 
essential drugs has allowed many drug companies to acquire a monopoly power over 
the market, effectively eliminating any price competition.  Thus far, Congress’ 
“hands off approach” towards prescription drug prices has done nothing to help 
reduce these costs.189  
With public concern over high drug prices increasing many members of Congress 
have been making efforts to make prescription drugs more accessible and affordable 
for Americans.190  The APDA was introduced in order to lower drug prices through 
competition not price controls.191  The bill states, “[u]nder certain conditions, if a 
prescription drug provides a substantial public health benefit and is unreasonably 
priced, as determined by the Secretary of Health, the federal government may require 
drug manufacturers to license their patent to generic drug companies.”192  This would 
allow competitors to market new drugs before patent expiration, while paying the 
original inventor royalties for that right.193 
By reducing the drug industry’s power and increasing consumer power the 
APDA decreases the cost of prescription drug prices by subjecting pharmaceutical 
companies to competitive forces.  The bill itself is based upon, and draws from, 
intellectual property laws already established in the U.S., such as those dealing with 
pollution control devices, in which accessibility is an issue.194  The success of these 
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programs is an excellent indicator of how effective the APDA will be in making 
prescription drugs more accessible and affordable. 
Drug companies are in business to maximize profits in order to prosper and 
create new drugs.  Therefore, it is important not to take away any incentive these 
companies have for being innovative and aspiring to be the first to enter the market.  
The APDA is a proposal that would do just that by bringing down prices without 
taking away the drug companies incentive to act like an industry.195  This balancing 
act would be accomplished by the APDA rewarding the patent holder for being the 
first to create and market a new drug with the royalties paid to that company.196  Still, 
it would, through competitive forces, moderate prices that are too high and make 
many life saving drugs more readily available to consumers who need them.197  
Furthermore, the APDA allows pharmaceutical companies the option to work 
together with the government and avoid a compulsory license by voluntarily 
reducing the price to a reasonable amount that would allow the company to profit 
from the drug, while still making it more accessible and affordable to the American 
public.198  
An important policy issue that must be resolved in order for the APDA to be 
effective is the determination of what constitutes an essential drug.  It is imperative 
that a systematic process be established so that the APDA is effective.  Many 
borderline determinations of essential or non-essential drugs will prove to be less 
problematic if a set of criteria to help make these determinations is already in place.  
The optimal choice for the APDA is to focus on the guidelines and precedent set by 
the WHO and its Eleventh Model List of essential drugs.  Using the same criteria as 
the WHO is ideal since the original goal of the list parallels that of the APDA’s goal.  
This goal is “to advance health equity through expanded access to basic 
medicines.”199 More specifically, the WHO has broadly defined essential drugs as 
“those that satisfy the health needs of the majority of the population and should 
therefore be available at all times in adequate amounts and in appropriate dosage 
forms.”200  Using such a broad definition as a basis for developing a more precise set 
of criteria to create a systematic process for determining what is an essential drug 
will prove to be beneficial to the success of the APDA. 
Industry threats that any type of governmental intervention to reduce the price of 
drugs would inevitably hinder the research and development of new life-saving drugs 
has consistently destroyed any hope of lower prices.  While profits from already 
existing drugs are vital to the research and development of new drugs, the threat does 
not hold true when one examines the underlying facts.   
First, the amount of research and development funded by the drug company itself 
has been exaggerated to lead many to believe that all of the money spent on research 
and development is coming directly from the company.  However, in actuality, over 
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fifty percent of the funding for research and development often comes from public 
sources such as the NIH.  Furthermore, the government currently provides a major 
incentive to drug companies to invest more into research and development through 
large tax breaks given to those companies that invest the most.  Both of these points 
are relevant to show that what small amount of profits that maybe lost due to the 
promotion of competition, through the APDA, will in no way have a detrimental 
effect on the research and development of new drugs. 
Second, the drug industry is one of the most profitable industries in the world.  Its 
average profit growth rate is three times greater than any other industry and the 
industry’s revenues have reached a staggering $106 billion dollars per year.  Such 
success has resulted in a spoiled and greedy industry, which focuses more on profits 
than it does on relieving the pain and suffering of those in need.  The profits 
currently generated from prescription sales currently show no signs of weakening.  
This helps disprove the industry’s argument that government induced competition 
would deter any further research and development because of loss of profits. 
Third, since the FDA has approved direct-to-the-consumer advertising the 
majority of new drug profits go towards advertising expenses rather than towards 
research and development.  A recent study conducted by the NIHC has revealed that 
twenty-five of the most heavily advertised drugs have accounted for more than 40 
percent of the increase in retail drug spending.201  These advertising expenditures are 
in direct conflict with the drug industry’s argument that a reduction in profits due to 
reduced market protection will lead to fewer innovative drugs.  Furthermore, the 
economic policy of patent protection should not be used to pay for marketing 
expenditures, but rather to reinvest into research and development of new drugs. 
The drug industry argues that in order to relieve the financial burden of high drug 
prices from America’s senior citizens a Medicare modernization or private insurance 
enrollment plan would be the most effective measure.  More specifically the drug 
industry has argued the best way to make drugs more accessible and affordable for 
the elderly is “to make prescription drugs affordable for seniors by enrolling all 38 
million in private health insurance plans.”202 This argument makes the faulty 
assumption that enrollment in private health insurance or expanding Medicare 
coverage, alone, will make prescription drugs more accessible and affordable to 
senior citizens while allowing prices to remain the same.  Enrollment in private 
health insurers alone will do little to solve the accessibility and affordability of 
prescription drugs especially during a period where private insurers are cutting back 
their prescription drug benefits.203  In any event, such an argument represents a 
dramatic departure from the industry’s original argument for a free market system. 
Such a departure indicates that the bottom line to drug companies is not what 
economic theory will make prescription drugs more available to Americans, but 
rather what is the most expedient method to increase profits.   
Congress is currently debating whether the Medicare program should offer 
prescription drug coverage.  While amending current Medicare coverage would help 
alleviate some of the financial burden on the elderly, without lower prices its long-
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term solvency will be damaged.204  This is not to say that Medicare should not be 
expanded to cover prescription drugs, it should; however, this alone will not solve 
the problems caused by high drug prices.  Expansion of Medicare to provide 
prescription drug coverage along with the availability of lower priced drugs provided 
via the APDA would allow Medicare the ability to cover senior citizens while not 
putting its long-term solvency at risk.   
America can no longer stand idly by and allow an already spoiled industry to 
regulate prescription drug prices by limiting competition through patent protection.  
Congress must not back down from the constant threat that any intrusion or restraints 
placed upon the industry will inevitably lead to a reduction in innovative prescription 
drugs.  The APDA is the optimal implementation plan, which will allow the 
government to increase the level of competition in the prescription drug market and 
thus reduce prescription drug prices without chilling research and development of 
new essential drugs.  Governmental assistance has never been more necessary in 
order to provide the American public with affordable and accessible drugs.   
JOHN D. PINZONE 
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